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After Search Neutrality: Drawing a Line between
Promotion and Demotion
DANIEL A. CRANE*
Abstract: The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC” or “the
commission”) January 3, 2013 decision to close its
longstanding investigation of Google1 brings to a close a
flurry of discussion over the possibility that Google could
become subject to a “search neutrality” principle in the
United States.2 Although the Commission found against
Google on several grounds, it rejected petitions from
Google’s critics to create a search neutrality principle as a
matter of antitrust law. This essay briefly analyzes what
remains of U.S. antitrust scrutiny of Internet search bias
after the Google settlement. In particular, it suggests that a
sensible line can be drawn between promotion of a search
engine’s own properties and demotion of rival properties.
Although distinctions of this kind are inherently slippery, in
this case the distinction should serve well enough. As of this
writing, the wild card remains the European Commission,
which may yet upset the applecart.

* Associate Dean, Faculty & Research, and Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law,
University of Michigan.

Statement of the FTC, In the Matter of Google, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 121-0120 (Jan. 3,
2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemotorolastmtofcomm.pdf.
1

2 See Marvin Ammori & Luke Pelican, Competitors’ Proposed Remedies for Search Bias:
“Neutrality” and Other Proposals, 15 No. 11 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2012); Daniel A. Crane,
Search Neutrality and Referral Dominance, J. COMP. L. & ECON. (2012); Daniel A. Crane,
Search Neutrality as an Antitrust Principle, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1199 (2012); Geoffrey
A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, If Search Neutrality is the Answer, What’s the Question?,
2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 151 (2012).
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I. THE SETTLEMENT
The FTC’s investigation of Google grew out of two separate and
largely unrelated sets of business practices. One involved a set of
patent licensing issues that Google inherited in its June 2012
acquisition of Motorola Mobility. Prior to Google’s acquisition,
Motorola had made certain commitments to standard-setting
organizations (“SSOs”) to license standard-essential patents (“SEPs”)
relating to smartphones, tablet computers, and video games on fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms. Motorola
supposedly breached these commitments, not only by refusing to
license fairly but by seeking injunctions against alleged infringers
practicing SEPs. Google supposedly continued these unfair practices
after acquiring Motorola. Under the terms of the settlement, Google
will have to license its SEPs on FRAND terms.3
A separate part of the investigation focused on Google’s practices
with respect to Internet search. Some advertisers and rival websites
complained that Google was restricting advertisers’ ability to
participate in Google’s AdWords platform and simultaneously
advertise on rival websites using the same terms. Rival websites also
complained that Google was crawling their sites and displaying their
content on Google’s Covered Webpages. To settle these charges,
Google wrote a commitment letter to the Commission, promising to
allow websites to opt out of display on Google’s Covered Webpages if
the website had been crawled by Google and allowing online
advertisers more flexibility to simultaneously manage ad campaigns
on Google’s AdWords platform and on rival ad platforms.4
However, the big story of the Google settlement was not the
commitments on SEP licensing, AdWords, or opting out of Covered
WebPages. It was the Commission’s rejection of claims by critics that
“Google unfairly promoted its own vertical properties through changes
in its search results page, such as the introduction of the ‘Universal
Search’ box, which prominently displayed Google vertical search
results in response to certain types of queries, including shopping and
local.”5 Surprisingly to many observers, the Commission rejected these
3

Statement of the FTC, In the Matter of Google Inc., supra note 1.

4 Letter from David Drummond, Senior Vice President of Corporate Development and
Chief Legal Officer, Google, Inc., to the Honorable Jon Leibowitz, Chairman of the Fed.
Trade Comm’n (Dec. 27, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/
130103googleletterchairmanleibowitz.pdf.
5

Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Google Inc., supra note 1.
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claims without requiring any concessions from Google.6 Indeed, the
Commission went so far as to find that the conduct complained of was
procompetitive:
Google adopted the design changes that the
Commission investigated to improve the quality of its
search results, and that any negative impact on actual
or potential competitors was incidental to that purpose.
While some of Google’s rivals may have lost sales due
to an improvement in Google’s product, these types of
adverse effects on particular competitors from vigorous
rivalry are a common byproduct of ‘competition on the
merits’ and the competitive process that the law
encourages.7
Despite the fact that Google had to make three significant
concessions in order to settle the case, the leading news media
correctly reported that the settlement was a major victory for Google.8
They could just as easily have reported it as a major defeat for
Microsoft, Tripadvisor, Kayak, Hotwire, Expedia, Oracle, Nokia, and
their allies in the Fair Search coalition that for several years had been
promoting an aggressive antitrust case against Google’s biasing of
Internet search.9 The FTC has hardly been a bastion of pro-business
conservatism in recent years and has taken an aggressive position
against other high-tech companies such as Intel.10 That the FTC would
walk away from the search bias claims, that had been mobilized by big
monied interests and pursued by leading academics and lawyers, is a
strong testament to the weakness of search neutrality demands under
6

Id.

Statement of the FTC Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In the Matter of Google, Inc.,
F.T.C. File No. 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013), available at
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf.

7

See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, A Victory for Google as F.T.C. Takes No Formal Steps, N. Y.
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/technology/google-agrees-tochanges-in-search-ending-us-antitrust-inquiry.html?_r=0.
8

9

See generally, Fair Search, http://www.fairsearch.org.

10 See Don Clark and Brent Kendall, Intel Settles Antitrust Case: Semiconductor Giant
Settles U.S. Probe, Agrees to New Restrictions on Its Business Practices, WALL ST. J., Aug.
5, 2010, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052748704017904575409152910216786.
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contemporary U.S. antitrust precedents. Search neutrality was
stillborn as a principle of U.S. antitrust law on January 3, 2013.
That search neutrality as a broad principle has failed in the United
States does not mean that Google (or, in the future, other dominant
search engines) are free from antitrust scrutiny for the design and
management of their search engines. The FTC settlement represents
the rejection of a particular kind of claim about Google’s obligations to
be “neutral” in the presentation of search results. It may leave open
other types of claims about search biasing.

II. THE FAILURE OF SEARCH NEUTRALITY
At the heart of the search neutrality movement lies a claim that
Google was monopolizing the Internet by leveraging its market power
in organic or universal Internet search into adjacent spaces on the
Internet. In this narrative, Google started out as an information
broker akin to a librarian who could point customers to the books they
were looking for. Google long assured its customers that its PageRank
algorithm was a neutral information compiler, creating hierarchies of
saliency based on the wisdom of the crowds. Google was just a mirror
for the preferences of its users—it had no points of view itself. It
provided ten blue links per page drawn from the wisdom of the
crowds.
Over time, however, Google grew from just a librarian to an owner
of some of the books in the library. For example, instead of just
linking its customers to the most popular shopping sites, Google
developed its own shopping site. Its properties soon included the
gamut of Internet content: YouTube for video content, Google maps as
an alternative to MapQuest, Google Plus for social networking, Google
Travel, etc. As Google’s properties grew, a conflict of interest arose.
Instead of acting as the neutral librarian, Google could steer people
who stopped at the reference desk or card catalogues to its own books.
Google began to override its neutral algorithms and bias search results
in favor of its own search verticals and other content.
Critics charge that Google is the “gateway” to the Internet; it has
been able to subvert competition on the Internet by favoring its own
properties. Elsewhere, I have expressed skepticism that Google is
quite the Internet gateway that its strongest critics suggest.11 Existing
data suggest that Google’s share of referrals to other websites, such as
news or travel sites, are relatively modest, which means that users are

11

See Crane, Referral Dominance, supra note 2.

2014]

CRANE

401

finding their ways to websites through many paths other than
universal search.12 There are many ways besides entering a query into
a search engine to access Internet content–think of Facebook or other
social networks, linking from other websites, bookmarks, and typing
in a URL. Mobile apps are a strong and increasing threat to universal
search as an Internet gateway.13
Be that as it may, the FTC did not reject claims that Google is
dominant in referring users to websites. Rather, it found that Google’s
evolutionary modification of the architecture of search was
procompetitive and consistent with advancement of consumer
interests. The FTC’s decision not to pursue the claim that Google
violated the antitrust laws by switching from a library catalogue “ten
blue links” model to an integrated information portal model
eliminates any serious possibility that claims about the increasing
integration of Google content into Google universal search will be
subject to antitrust liability in the United States. By not only finding
that Google’s evolution did not harm competition but that it was
affirmatively procompetitive, the Commission strongly signaled that it
would not employ Section 5 of the FTC Act–which is arguably the
most potent antitrust weapon available to any U.S. antitrust enforcer14
–to scrutinize the architecture of Internet search.
The FTC’s decision was consistent with a longstanding reluctance
by courts and antitrust enforcers to employ antitrust law to supervise
product design, particularly in highly dynamic markets such as
Internet search. As the D.C. Circuit recognized in one of its Microsoft
decisions, “[a]ntitrust scholars have long recognized the undesirability
of having courts oversee product design, and any dampening of
technological innovation would be at cross-purposes with antitrust
12

Id.

Claire Cain Miller, As Web Search Goes Mobile, Competitors Chip at Google’s Lead, N. Y.
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2013),http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/technology/as-web-searchgoes-mobile-apps-chip-at-googleslead.html?pagewanted=all (reporting that the nature of
search is changing as customers increasingly access Internet content using apps on mobile
devices); Charles Arthur, Google and Microsoft under threat from the march of the
mobiles, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 2012),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/oct/19/google-microsoft-smartphoneapps (“People are turning to apps more and more for services, which has led to a serious
decline in PC and search engine use.”).
13

See Daniel A. Crane, Reflections on Section 5 of the FTC Act and the FTC's Case Against
Intel, CPI Antitrust Chron. (Feb. 28, 2010),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/reflections-on-section-5-of-the-ftc-actthe-ftc-s-case-against-intel.
14
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law.”15 A broad search neutrality principle would have meant
comprehensive oversight of universal search design to ensure access,
neutrality, and competition. It could easily have chilled innovation.
The FTC was wise to decline the invitation. Such a role would have
stretched the Commission’s institutional capabilities to the breaking
point, emboldened Google’s rivals to use the regulatory process rather
than the marketplace to compete, and ultimately produced little of
value to consumers.

III. PROMOTION VS. DEMOTION
While declining to invoke antitrust principles to scrutinize
Google’s designing and redesigning of Internet search, the
Commission did not directly rule out antitrust scrutiny of a different
kind of potentially anticompetitive action relating to Google:
deliberately demoting rivals’ search results rankings in order to stymie
competition. Google may be protected if it promotes its own search
verticals or other Internet properties by advantaging them in the
display of universal search results, but what if it demotes a rival? Does
the freedom to promote Google properties include the right to demote
rival properties?
Before answering that question, consider the allegations in a
currently pending “demotion” case brought by Foundem, a U.K.
vertical search company that has become the poster child David in the
David vs. Goliath stories told about Google. (Microsoft, another
leading Google antagonist, doesn’t play the “David” role as well).
Founded in 2005, Foundem specializes in vertical search and price
comparisons in various product categories such as flights, electronics,
appliances, hotels, and real estate.16 According to Foundem, “[F]rom
June 2006 to December 2009 Foundem was effectively ‘disappeared
from the Internet’ by a Google penalty that systematically excluded all
of its content from Google’s search results.”17 Foundem alleges that it
was caught in Google’s filters that are designed to keep spammers or
other sites that try to cheat on Google’s algorithms from being

15

U. S. v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

16

The Foundem Difference, FOUNDEM.COM, http://www.foundem.co.uk.

17 Foundem’s Google Story, SEARCHNEUTRALITY.ORG (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://www.searchneutrality.org/eu-launches-formal-investigation/foundem-googlestory.
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promoted in Google’s PageRanks.18 When legitimate “high profile sites
that would be conspicuous if absent from Google’s search results” fall
afoul of the filers, Google grants them immunity through
“‘whitelisting’ (a.k.a. ‘manual lift’).”19 However, Google supposedly
refused to whitelist Foundem, allowing the company to stay trapped in
the purgatory of demoted page ranking. Further, Foundem alleges
that Google’s intentions in keeping Foundem in ranking purgatory
were anticompetitive. Google supposedly did not want to see
Foundem emerge as a competitor to its own search verticals, and
hence used its power in universal search to keep Google users from
linking to Foundem.
Foundem has been playing hardball. A week after the FTC closed
its investigation, Foundem brought an antitrust suit against Google in
the U.K.20 It has been prodding the European Commission to take
action against Google and vocally advocating against Google’s
proposed remedial commitments in Europe.21
Google, of course, has a very different take. It claims that
Foundem was demoted because it had little to offer users and
therefore deserved to be lower in Google’s page ranks.22 It points to an
Econsultancy study finding that “Foundem is pretty much an
aggregator of third party content, with very little unique content of its
own.”23 Google thus claims that Foundem was demoted not because it
was a competitive threat but because it was a lousy service.
Are claims like Foundem’s barred by the logic of the FTC’s
decision? The FTC deals with “demotion” claims in the following
paragraph of its statement:

18 Id.
19

Id.

20

Infederation Ltd. v. Google, Inc., [2013] EWHC (Ch) 2295, 2013 WL 3811075 (Eng.)

Stephanie Bodoni, Google Plans to Settle EU Probe Should Be Rejected, Foundem Says,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 14, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-14/googleplans-to-settle-eu-probe-should-be-rejected-foundem-says.html.
21

22 Julia Holtz, Committed to Competing Fairly, GOOGLE PUBLIC POLICY BLOG (Feb. 23,
2010), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2010/02/committed-to-competingfairly.html.

Chris Lake, Foundem vs. Google: A Case Study in SEO Fail, ECONSULTANCY (Aug. 18,
2009), http://econsultancy.com/us/blog/4456-foundem-vs-google-a-case-study-in-seofail.
23
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[F]or shopping queries, Google demoted all but one or
two comparison shopping properties from the first
page of Google’s search results to a later page.
Demoting comparison shopping properties had the
effect of elevating to page one certain merchant and
other websites. These changes resulted in significant
traffic loss to the demoted comparison shopping
properties, arguably weakening those websites as rivals
to Google’s own shopping vertical. On the other hand,
these changes to Google’s search algorithm could
reasonably be viewed as improving the overall quality
of Google’s search results because the first search page
now presented the user with a greater diversity of
websites.24
One interpretation of this statement is that demotion is merely the
converse of promotion and that antitrust law should not be in the
business of scrutinizing either. If Google changes its algorithms to
favor merchants in its page ranks (promotion), then it necessarily is
bumping down third party aggregators (demotion). One could not
allow Google to adjust its algorithms to promote one kind of result but
prohibit it to demote other types of results since the presentation of
results is purely ordinal. Arguably, promoting one kind of content
necessarily involves demoting another, and any distinction between
promotion and demotion is therefore vacuous.
That logic would suggest that claims like Foundem’s are out of
luck on the FTC’s pro-innovation and freedom of design reasoning.
But that need not follow. Recall that Foundem’s complaint is not just
that Google reengineered its algorithms to demote third party
aggregators (although that is part of the complaint), but that Google
employed a secret and selective system to manually promote
particular sites that it did not believe posed a competitive threat while
allowing disfavored sites to languish down the hierarchy of page
rankings. If that claim is correct, Google’s sin was not merely
redesigning its algorithms to reflect more accurately its users’
preferences, but making individualized decisions on which search
verticals should be allowed on the first results page and which should
be kept off.
That sort of claim may not present the concerns that led the FTC
to reject a broad search neutrality principle. To the extent that the
24

Statement of the FTC, In the Matter of Google, Inc., supra note 1.
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demotion of particular sites is not part of the overall design of the
Google system but an individualized decision on the merits of
particular rivals, antitrust institutions might have fewer concerns that
they will be called upon to oversee “product design” in determining
whether a particular demotion is anticompetitive. The relevant
antitrust decision would ultimately not turn on engineering
considerations of the kind that antitrust courts and agencies prefer
not to make (i.e., the composition of the algorithm) but rather on
individualized business judgments of the kind that antitrust courts
and agencies are much more comfortable scrutinizing (i.e., whether a
particular search vertical should be promoted or demoted). Once the
question is not explicitly about Google’s product design–about
essentially engineering choices–but about its tailored categorization of
a particular competitor, concerns about agency or judicial
intervention and impairing innovation diminish.
To be sure, such claims would not be easy to win. I have previously
suggested that such claims should have to overcome a series of
strenuous hurdles, including proof that Google overrode its general
algorithms as to a particular competitor, that it did not have any
legitimate reason for making that decision, that Google should be
accorded a “business judgment rule” on its reasons for the manual
override, and that the demotion increased or maintained Google’s
market power (which would be a necessary element of any antitrust
claim).25 I offer no opinion on whether Foundem or other complaints
(such as the one lodged by the French legal search vertical
ejustice.fr)26 have merit. My observation is simply that the (quite
proper) rejection of a general search neutrality principle need not bar
scrutiny of the demotion of particular rivals for anticompetitive
reasons.

IV. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION WILD CARD
As of this writing, the European Commission (“EC”) continues to
mull its options with respect to Google. The European Commission
gave a surprisingly cold shoulder to the FTC, saying that the FTC

25

Crane, Search Neutrality as an Antitrust Principle, supra note 2, at 1207-08.

Foo Yun Chee, French site Ejustice.fr charges Google with Fresh Abuse, REUTERS (Feb.
22, 2011) http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/22/us-google-ejusticeidUSTRE71L1SJ20110222.

26
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decision would have no effect on the EC’s ongoing investigation.27
Google has since offered “commitments” to solve the Commission’s
concerns, and the Commission has responded by opening a monthlong “consultation” process to allow comments by third parties–an
apparent signal of unenthusiasm for Google’s proposal.28 Europe has
long been more assertive on unilateral abuse of dominance issues than
the United States. A broad search neutrality principle remains
possible in Europe.
It is also worth noting that the issue of Internet search dominance
is not purely a Google question. Although Google is dominant in much
of the world, it has a very small share of search in some important
world markets including Russia, South Korea, and China. In each of
those markets, a home-grown (and sometimes government-promoted)
search engine holds a similar position of dominance to Google’s in the
United States. Already, there have been complaints of search bias
against some of these search engines as well.29 The decisions of the
FTC and EC may set influential precedents on the legal treatment of
search bias claims around the world. In the meantime, Google may
not be free and clear in the United States either. Claims of selective
demotion of rival sites may still have legs.

US Google Ruling to have no Effect on EU Probe, REUTERS, (Jan. 7, 2013),
http://www.iol.co.za/scitech/technology/news/us-google-ruling-to-have-no-effect-on-euprobe-1.1448314#.UlBjK2rD9Ms.

27

Alex Barker & Bede McCarthy, Google’s Rivals Try to Hit Brussels Pact, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e52fd8d0-ad9b-11e2-a2c700144feabdc0.html#axzz2TO4hp35i.
28

29 See Bai du bei su long duan shi chang “fan long duan di yi an” jin ri kai ting [Baidu is
Sued for Monopoly “First Antitrust Lawsuit” and Opened a Court Session Today], BEIJING
NO. 1 INTERMEDIATE PEOPLE COURT ONLINE PRESS, Apr. 22, 2009, available at
http://bj1zy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=612 (in Chinese) (describing a social
networking site – one similar to Facebook – and its 2009 complaint, which alleged that the
Baidu search engine intentionally blocked the social networking site from its search
results.); see also Jiangxiao Athena Hou & Jane Yi, A Progress Report on the
Implementation of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 20 No. 1 COMPETITION: J. ANTI. & UNFAIR
COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 79, 85-86 (2011).

